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Summary
The ongoing realisation of the enlargement of the Western alliance will create a new challenge for the
future of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). At present Russia strictly opposes the
enlargement and has rejected any compromise. Russian diplomats have demanded that the weapons of
the East-Central European countries hould be counted as part of the NATO group ceilings if these
countries join the Western alliance. They have indicated that Russia could withdraw from the treaty if
this is not done. From the Russian point of view, it seems to be a political circumvention f the CFE
Treaty if East-Central European countries accede to NATO without changing their CFE group of sta-
tes membership. With its new proposal on the modernisation f the CFE Treaty on 23 April 1996 in
Vienna, the Russian Federation underlined its principal rejection of the enlargement and increased the
political pressure on the West because it could use its opposition to enlargement as an instrument to
block the modernisation f CFE.
On the other hand NATO countries argue that from the point of international l w the enlargement
would have no effect on the treaty. However, there is an admission that the consequences forthe treaty
could only be evaluated if new members were actually to j in the alliance. Within NATO there is in
general a broad consensus to offer Russia some kind of compensation. What is still a matter of dispute
is the time, nature and extent of the appropriate Western accommodations because the moment and
extent of enlargement have not yet been decided.
In spite of the fact that there is no movement in the central question, one can see a slight rapproche-
ment between the sides on a subordinate l vel. During the CFE Review Conference all participants
agreed to the Russian request to start immediately negotiations "aimed at improving the operation of
the Treaty in a changing environment". The "scope and parameters" for these talks "should be defined
as a matter of priority" and a "progress report" should be presented at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, in-
cluding "recommendations  the way ahead". In its new proposal Russia has also hinted at certain
possibilities for compromise. It is no longer demanding a renegotiation f the CFE Treaty, a "supple-
mentary agreement" would suffice, and it is being suggested that there would be no need for a formal
ratification of adjustment measures. These ar very important steps to reduce the fears of many CFE
member states that negotiations on adaptation and modernisation could be a slippery road to the rela-
xation of the treaty requirements. Finally, the ceilings for the newly proposed alliance sufficiency rule
are being left open, which signals a preparedness to be flexible in negotiations.
Cooperative s curity policy for Europe and the CFE Treaty can only survive if both sides are prepared
for a fair compromise. But a compromise r quires a clear understanding of what is at stake and of what
both sides want for their security. In this context it is not good policy for Russia simply to say no to
the enlargement of NATO, because this would mean abandoning any chance of influencing the price
the West must pay for it. Secondly, Russia needs to make a clear decision on the question of what it
seeks to btain from NATO. Also, NATO must answer specific questions: will NATO enlargement
stop after the accession of the Visegrad states, or will it be an open process? The answer will have a
profound impact on possible solutions. The paradox of the present situation is that neither side has yet
made its position clear enough for the other side to be able to decide on its own negotiating strategy.
Besides this situation there are numerous possibilities for a compromise. Within the framework of its
own approach, the West could offer the Russian Federation a binding unilateral reduction of the We-
stern entitlements and of those of the East-Central European candidates for NATO membership. As
one of the main beneficiaries of NATO enlargement, Germany could offer additional unilateral reduc-
tions or NATO could offer an additional declaration not to exceed certain limits in Central Europe.
The NATO states' actual holdings are already 25% below their entitlements, and the East European
armed forces will follow this trend in the long term as they modernise and transform themselves into
professional rmies, so there is enough room for manoeuvre. These unilateral nd binding declarations
should ensure that the Western group of states does not exceed its present ceilings even after the ac-
cession of new members. As additional confidence-building measures, the West can offer for example
notification of and invitation to observe joint military manoeuvres in the new East-Central European
NATO states at a battalion or brigade level and at the equivalent level for air forces and naval exerci-
ses, and also the possibility that Russian and other non-NATO armed forces could participate in such
manoeuvres.
This step could in turn make it possible to do away with the group of states concept altogether, for
instance by means of a joint declaration. This would also be a positive step because since the end of
the East-West conflict he group of states concept is the main obstacle preventing other European sta-
tes acceding to he CFE Treaty. However, three fundamental questions could arise here. Firstly, what
would the consequences be for major provisions of the treaty such as national entitlements, the
D.P.S.S. rule, and the passive inspection quota? Secondly there is the question of what procedure
should be followed in the event of a further NATO enlargement. The Russian Federation and the next
candidates for NATO membership will, for different reasons, have a particular interest in clarifying
this issue in order to make future NATO enlargements more predictable. Thirdly, once the group of
states approach as been abandoned the zonal concept is also redundant. Both Ukraine and Russia are
interested in getting rid of this concept, since they feel themselves to bediscriminated against by the
separate limitations placed on what used to be the Kiev Military District (in the case of Ukraine) and
on the flanks; these two states are the only treaty signatories forced to accept limitations within their
own territories. The difficulty here is that problems would immediately arise with Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Norway, who see the flank rule as an indispensable element of the CFE treaty. Without additional
regional measures, therefore, the treaty regime cannot simply abandon the group of states approach
and the zonal concept.
With the introduction of a new sufficiency rule for military alliances, future NATO enlargements
could be made more predictable. The problem with this idea is that the new rule is likely to amount to
an additional obstacle to future NATO enlargements and so to be resisted by East European candidates
for membership. The question is, is it possible to include enough flexibility in this new rule and to
satisfy the security needs of all participants. In addition to this idea, a new restrictive troop-stationing
rule would be conceivable, as a way of reducing Russian fears on this score.
It remains to be seen whether the NATO countries can achieve the necessary unity and whether they
have sufficient room for manoeuvre in terms of domestic politics. The reform of NATO and a redistri-
bution of alliance tasks and burdens is a key precondition for this. The West European states, espe-
cially France, are in the context of increasing EU autonomy less interested in additional restrictions
and reductions than in finding additional room for manoeuvre. The Russian Federation and the USA,
on the other hand, both have an interest in containing and controlling Western Europe. Radical disar-
mament measures would therefore heighten the West European dilemma of having to choose between
greater dependence onthe USA and greater autonomy. Russia wants neither to drive the West Europe-
ans back into the arms of the USA, nor to encourage West European autonomy if this can be avoided;
given the overall goals of cooperation and control, this could make less drastic West European reduc-
tions the more attractive option. The Russian Federation's dilemma could be that it needs to be able to
point to substantial Western cuts in order to disarm domestic riticism of a foreign policy seen by so-
me to be too weak.
